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Periodically the question of whether there ought to be a substantially closer connection 
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Introduction 
 Periodically during my professional career as an economist – which now spans over four 
decades – the question of whether there ought to be a close – or at least, a substantially closer – 
connection between the disciplines of industrial organization (IO) and finance has been a topic of 
conversation within the IO field.  Although both disciplines could be considered to be part of the 
broader area of business economics, both are largely separate from each other. 
Usually, the discussion about a closer connection takes the form of a vague hope that IO 
economists ought somehow to be able to take more of what is being addressed in finance and 
incorporate those concepts into IO analyses – whether theoretical or empirical.  I used to have 
some of these vague hopes myself. 
 I have now come to the conclusion that this goal of a substantially closer connection is a 
chimera.  I offer that conclusion as someone who has been a practicing IO economist for over 40 
years and who has also been a practicing financial economist – at least with respect to financial 
institutions (especially depository and mortgage-related institutions) and their regulation – for 
over 25 years.  In support of this position I will discuss the three initiatives of which I am aware 
that seemed to offer the promise of some integration of IO and finance; in the end, all three 
turned out to be blind alleys.  In addition I will offer some thoughts about why inherently this 
goal would be a difficult one at best and probably not worth the effort.  However, there are still 
at least two areas where IO and finance have fruitfully interacted and should continue to do so, 
which will be discussed in the concluding section. 
 
The three failed initiatives 
The inclusion of risk in profit-concentration empirical studies 
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 In the 1960s and early 1970s the conceptual basis for modern finance – the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) – was developed and circulated more widely through the economics 
profession.  The important insight from the CAPM was that (in a context where investors would 
rationally hold a diversified portfolio of assets) the appropriate measure of the riskiness of an 
asset was the covariance of its returns with the broad market’s returns, rather than just the own-
variance of the asset’s returns. 
 The application to the empirical IO of the time was straightforward:  Profit-concentration 
regression studies were then the primary way of testing the structure-conduct performance (S-C-
P) paradigm that had been developed by Mason (1939, 1959) and Bain (1951, 1956); these 
studies were at the forefront of the efforts to determine whether firms in high-concentration 
(oligopoly) industries were exercising market power – as would be indicated by comparatively 
high profit rates in those industries.  It was clear that there needed to be some correction for the 
riskiness of an industry, since risk would likely be an influence on what was considered to be a 
“normal” (or competitive) rate of return in the industry.  And the CAPM indicated that this 
measure of risk should be a covariance measure rather than a simple variance measure. 
 A few empirical studies in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Hurdle, 1974) did include a risk 
measure (though not always a covariance measure) as an explanatory variable in those profit-
concentration regressions.  But the 1970s were the “last hurrah” for these kinds of studies:  The 
accounting measures of profitability that were the standard left-hand-side (LHS) variable for 
these studies came under close scrutiny and intense criticism, as did the issue of whether high 
profitability (even if measured properly) would necessarily be an indicator of the exercise of 
market power (e.g., Demsetz, 1974; Mancke, 1974).  These kinds of studies fell out of fashion in 
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IO by the early 1980s,1
Tobin’s Q as an indicator of market power 
 and with them went the covariance-of-profitability measures that were 
based on the CAPM. 
 Tobin (1969) developed his “Q” measure – the ratio of the aggregate market value of a 
firm’s assets divided by the reproduction cost of those assets – in the late 1960s primarily as a 
macroeconomic tool:  If the value of Q for a major firm in a sector (or the sector itself) exceeds 
1.0, firms should find it worthwhile to expand their investments in that sector, since the returns 
should exceed the costs. 
 In the early 1980s Lindenberg and Ross (1981) suggested that Q could also be considered 
to be an indicator of the above-normal profits that could arise from the exercise of market power 
and thus ought to be positively correlated with seller concentration, which appeared to be the 
case.  However, it was also clear that there were important other reasons for Q to exceed 1.0:  
For example, the market value numerator would surely include the value of intellectual property 
and of the value of brand-based goodwill, both of which would likely be poorly represented in 
the reproduction cost denominator, which was usually based on balance sheet data that tended to 
not include or under-represent such “intangible” assets.  Further, the criticism of accounting 
measures of profit that eroded confidence in the profit-concentration studies extended to the 
skepticism of balance sheet data more generally as good measures of the reproduction costs of 
the firm (at least partially because of the intellectual property and branding issues that were just 
mentioned). 
Consequently, studies that use Q as an indicator of market power have, like the profit-
concentration studies, fallen by the wayside since the 1980s. 
Event studies that would help ascertain whether a merger would be anticompetitive 
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 Event studies have been a staple in empirical finance (and empirical accounting) since the 
late 1960s (e.g., Kothari and Warner, 2007).  The basic idea is that the market’s reaction to a 
firm’s announcement of an unanticipated event – say, a proposed merger – should be an indicator 
of the market’s expectations as to the consequences for the firm’s future profitability from that 
event.2
 In the early 1980s Baxter (1980) first proposed that the event study methodology might 
be used in the antitrust analysis of mergers.  He argued that the crucial focus should be on the 
competitors/rivals to the merging firms.  The S-C-P paradigm indicated that a merger that would 
be anticompetitive would do so by increasing seller concentration (in a relevant market) 
sufficiently that the firms in the market would (because of enhanced recognition of their mutual 
interdependence) reduce the intensity of their competition and thus be able jointly to raise their 
prices.
  And those expectations ought (on average) to be a good predictor of that future 
profitability, since if systematic biases in the way that the market reacted to such announcements 
were otherwise to be present, smart arbitrageurs ought to be able to exploit such systematic 
biases until those biases disappeared. (This “efficient markets” hypothesis/insight was another 
important intellectual development in the finance field in the late 1960s and early 1970s.) 
3
 Consequently, event studies that focused on the market reactions of the rivals’ share 
prices (and returns) ought to be able to determine of the nature of the merger for antitrust 
  In this context, if the consequences of the merger were anticipated to be anticompetitive, 
then the non-merging rivals to the merging firms ought to be (along with the merged firm) the 
beneficiaries of the higher industry-wide prices that would follow from the merger.  By contrast, 
if the primary effect of the merger was to reduce the costs of the merging firm (and have little or 
no effect on oligopolistic coordination), then the non-merging rivals would be at a disadvantage 
as a consequence of the merger. 
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purposes:  If the merger would likely be anticompetitive, then the event studies should yield a 
positive abnormal return for the rivals’ shares; if, instead, the merger was expected primarily to 
reduce the merged firm’s costs, then the event studies should yield negative abnormal returns for 
the rivals’ shares.  And, of course, if a merger were neutral, with neither market power nor cost-
efficiency consequences, then the event studies should yield little or no abnormal returns for the 
rivals. 
 However, even if the merger were cost-reducing, event studies might show positive 
abnormal returns for the rivals’ share prices, because the merger might awaken the market to the 
possibilities of cost-reducing mergers by the other firms in that market; and, equally contrarily, if 
the merger were to increase seller concentration and also affect vertical relationships with 
suppliers and/or customers in ways that would disadvantage the rival firms, the event studies 
might show negative abnormal returns for their share prices despite the increased seller 
concentration and likely higher prices.  Also, if the rivals weren’t publicly traded companies, 
event studies wouldn’t be possible.  And if the rivals were multi-product (and/or multi-area) 
companies and the relevant market for the merger accounted for only small fractions of the 
rivals’ profits, the event studies might yield little or no reactions because the profits at stake 
would be lost in the noise. 
 Consequently, after an initial flurry of interest in the early 1980s (e.g., Eckbo, 1983; 
Eckbo and Wier, 1985), there has been little subsequent use of event studies to examine the 
reactions of rivals’ share prices in antitrust merger analysis. 
 I am unaware of other major efforts to bring major elements of finance into IO since then. 
 
Why the quest is likely to be futile 
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 The history that has just been recounted does not offer great hope for greater integration 
of finance into IO.  And this pessimism is warranted.  After all, finance and IO are two major but 
separate specialty fields/disciplines within the broader field of economics.  Each discipline has 
its specialized courses that graduate students take during their Ph.D. studies.  Each has its own 
core theory and its own core empirical methods and frequently used data sets.  Few IO 
economists are familiar with the major issues of finance; few finance economists are familiar 
with the major issues of IO.4
 This separation was driven home to me a decade ago, when I co-authored a survey paper 
“Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation: Mostly Talk and Not Much Action?” (Frame and 
White, 2004).  What was striking to us were three contrasts:  The first was the sharp contrast 
(which motivated our paper) between the broad generalizations within the finance field about 
how important financial innovation had been and how little effort there had been actually to do 
any empirical testing of hypotheses that might help advance the profession’s understanding of 
the processes of financial innovation.  The second contrast was between this paucity of empirical 
studies of financial innovation and the far greater number of empirical IO studies of innovation 
in manufacturing and in many other sectors of the economy (but largely bypassing financial 
services).  And the third contrast was between the emphasis of the (comparatively few) empirical 
studies of financial innovation on the study of the characteristics of early adopters (often through 
diffusion studies) and the relative absence of an interest in the issues of how and why financial 
innovation occurred – which, at least since Schumpeter (1950), has been a major theme of 
empirical IO investigations of innovation (along with, of course, adoption/diffusion studies). 
 
 In thinking about these contrasts, Frame and I offered two tentative hypotheses to explain 
them:  First, the standard data sets that finance economists (especially in the U.S.) often work 
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with – the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) data files and Standard & Poor’s 
COMPUSTAT data files – are ill suited to uncovering any information about innovation.  By 
contrast, IO economists (especially in the U.S.) that are interested in innovation have 
traditionally been able to access annual patent data and annual research and development (R&D) 
data – with detailed industrial classifications and even firm-level identification often available 
for both data sets.  And for neither the patent data nor the R&D data has innovation activity by 
firms in the financial services areas been especially well represented. 
 Second, IO economists were unlikely to venture deeply into the finance area to study 
financial innovation, because they weren’t well trained in finance, so the basic ideas and basic 
institutions would mostly be foreign – except for diffusion studies, where adoption decisions 
(especially for automated teller machines [ATMs], which have been extensively studied) could 
be readily identified and hypotheses concerning the characteristics of potential adopters could be 
readily tested.  And finance economists had not been trained to think about innovation from an 
IO perspective, so that Schumpeter has been rarely mentioned by the finance economists who 
have written about financial innovation and concepts such as “appropriability” and 
“technological opportunity” are rarely mentioned as well. 
 In sum, the two fields were and remain separate; substantially closer integration is 
unlikely to occur. 
 
Conclusion 
 Although the goal of a major integration of finance into IO (or vice-versa) is a chimera, 
there are nevertheless at least two places where the two disciplines can usefully overlap.  First, as 
is true across the spectrum of industries in an economy, IO tools can be used to address IO 
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questions within the financial sector (e.g., S-C-P questions; efforts to explain specific pricing and 
other behavioral practices; innovation questions; etc.); of course, as should be true for any such 
study, the IO economists that conduct such studies should have enough understanding of the 
specific industry and its institutional detail that they can “get it right”.  Second, event studies can 
continue to be useful for providing an indication of the impact of legal or regulatory changes on 
firms or industries (e.g., Garbade, Silber, and White, 1982). 
 These are more modest targets for the interaction of the two disciplines.  But they are 
more realistic as well. 
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1 They were largely replaced by efforts to use price as the LHS variable in cross-section regressions for industries 
where local markets (and local levels of concentration) could be identified. 
2 Specifically, such a study would first establish a baseline (during an immediately preceding period of, say, 60 or 90 
days) of how the daily stock returns varied with the daily returns of the overall market (again making use of the 
insights of the CAPM).  Then, for a period shortly before the announcement (in case there had been an earlier 
leakage of the news) until shortly after the event (because the market would be expected quickly to reassess the 
firm’s future profitability prospects in light of the event) the daily returns for the firm would be compared to the 
expected daily returns for that firm given the overall market’s daily returns during that event “window” and the 
expected covariance of the firm with the market (as distilled from the baseline results).  A significant deviation from 
the expected return is dubbed an “abnormal” return. 
3 In the language of merger analysis of the 1990s and afterward, this was a “coordinated effects” theory of the 
potential anticompetitive effects of a merger.  The “unilateral effects” theory would also predict that the rivals would 
be beneficiaries of an anticompetitive merger. 
4 There are exceptions:  The Federal Reserve research staff has had a long tradition of hiring IO economists who 
either came to the Board of Governors with some understanding of finance or who acquired it through on-the-job 
training; and the 12 regional Federal Reserve banks have had a similar tradition.  Also, there are a few academic 
economists – mostly in business schools – who have become proficient in both fields.  Still, these are the exceptions. 
